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Abstract
We analyze how different policy interventions may incentive the transition of workers from
the informal to the formal sector. We use Italian data over the period 1998-2008 to evaluate
ex post whether the 2003 Italian labor market reform was able to reach the objective to
reduce the share of shadow employment. Based on our empirical results, we develop an
ex ante evaluation based on a search and matching model, á la Mortensen and Pissarides to
determine the right combination of policy interventions which may be effective in generating a
significant reduction in undeclared work together with an expansion of the formal sector. We
find that in an economy where permanent and temporary contracts coexist, the combination
of lower payroll taxes for permanent jobs and higher probability of being audited generates a
compression of the informal sector, leaving unemployment unchanged. A similar result can be
obtained through a reduction of the firing cost associated with permanent jobs, even though
this causes temporary contracts to increase relatively more than permanent contracts.
∗We are especially grateful to Claudio Lucifora, Marco Leonardi, Paolo Pinotti and all participants to the
Brucchi-Luchino conference and the Milano Labour Lunch Seminar (MILLS). The usual disclaimer applies.
†The views expressed are purely those of the author and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating
an official position of the European Commission.
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1 Introduction
As Governments in Europe and in the U.S. struggle to manage the fiscal legacies of the global
financial crisis and the prospect of a rapidly aging population, the circumstances that lead people
to work and trade in the shadow economy have increased significantly (Packard et al. , 2012).1
As noted by Boeri & Garibaldi (2002) and Schneider (2000), in recent years undeclared work has
grown consistently in both developed and less developed countries.2 This might not only imply
the existence of some degrees of tolerance towards labor tax evasion, but it might also suggest
that it is difficult to enforce deterrence. In the economic literature, there is still no consensus
on which instruments are effective towards achieving this goal, despite tax evasion being a topic
extensively studied. Increasing tax enforcement or augmenting the fines for this non compliant
behavior are commonly considered the two most compelling policy interventions to reduce evasion.
However, in both cases, the empirical literature shows contrasting evidence on the effect of these
instruments on tax compliance (Alm et al. , 1992; Andreoni et al. , 1998; Di Porto, 2011; Garrido
& Mittone, 2008). In addition, labor taxation and labor market regulations are also identified as
major factors influencing the decision of individuals to work in the informal sector.3 However, it is
also controversial whether any of these two instruments are effective towards achieving compliance.
For instance, labor taxes affect labor-leisure choices through a distortion effect caused by the
overall tax burden. The greater the difference between total labor costs in the formal economy
and after-tax earnings, the bigger the incentive to reduce the tax wedge and to work in the shadow
economy. Since the tax wedge depends on the level of social security and the overall tax burden,
these are key drivers for the persistence and growth of the shadow economy (Feld & Schneider,
2010). However, even when reforms carrying significant tax reductions are implemented, they do
not necessarily lead to a reduction of the informal sector.4 Moreover, high profits from irregular
1In several countries, (e.g., Italy, France, Germany), employers are responsible for paying a fraction of the social
security contributions for the benefits of their workers. In Italy this fraction amounts to two third of the total
contribution. Evading these payments is the same as declaring only some of the hours worked.
2Undeclared work plays a major role in several developing and developed countries. In a recent study Jutting &
de Laiglesia (2009) show that out of a global working population of 3 billion workers, nearly two-thirds (1.8 billion)
are undeclared or informal. Schneider (2011) estimates that in the European area the number of persons working in
the unofficial economy doubled from 1978 to 1998. According to a report of the Pew Hispanic Center, the number
of illegal immigrants living in the United States was 11.9 million in 2008, of which 8.3 million were part of the U.S.
labor force (Passel & Cohn, 2009). According to the Canadian Encyclopedia, the police and immigration personnel
estimated the number of illegal immigrants in Canada to range between 50,000 and 200,000. Similar percentages
are reported for BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Eastern European countries.
3The literature on tax evasion in recent years has shown that there are other factors that might be important
to fight tax evasion such as social capital, stigma, tax morale, tax salience. These concepts are closely related to
behavioral economics and therefore they are outside the scope of this paper.
4Wherever legal tax avoidance has been abolished and regulations have been unchanged, even a considerable cut
on the direct tax burden did not reduce the size of labor tax evasion. On the contrary, for a not negligible group
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activities (and associated investments in real and human capital) could generate disincentives for
workers to transit from the informal to the formal sector (Schneider, 1994; Spiro, 1993).
Understanding the role of labor market regulations in achieving compliance in labor tax eva-
sion is of great interest for economists.5 From a pure theoretical point of view the reduction of
monopsonistic powers is expected to lead towards a less segmented labor market and to a reduc-
tion of informality. Moreover, rigid employment protection legislations (EPL) are shown to have
negative effects both on job creation and on job destruction, reducing the overall turnover. This
might create incentives for firms to increase the utilization of temporary contracts or hire workers
in the informal sector. Fialova & Schneider (2009) and Hazans (2011) show that a reduction of
job protection has the potential to reduce informality; however, both analysis are carried out using
aggregate measures of informality in EU countries, and therefore the results can be interpreted
only as conditional means and not as causal effects. On the other hand, the effect of EPL on
formal employment has been extensively studied in the literature. Bertola et al. (1999) and Blan-
chard & Portugal (2001) find that EPL reduction affects labor market flows, increasing both job
creation and job destruction, with ambiguous results on total employment. Vindigni et al. (2013)
show that the effect of EPL on employment is hump-shaped: first employment increases and then
decreases as a function of the increased firing costs. In addition, in the literature there are no
papers providing micro-econometric causal evidence on the effect of EPL on shadow activities.
In summary, the effect of deterrence, taxation and labor market regulations on labor tax com-
pliance is still controversial. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing both theoretically
and empirically an analysis of this issue based on recent Italian labor market reforms. We develop
an ex post and ex ante social program evaluation on labor tax evasion in order to understand
how to achieve labor tax compliance without raising unemployment. Specifically, our goal is to
investigate whether combinations of policy instruments may be used to reduce labor tax evasion
while boosting the flow of workers from the informal to the formal sector and to emphasize the role
of temporary contracts in facilitating such transition. We call this process “emersion”.6 To under-
stand why compliance and “emersion” can be thought as closely related, but different concepts,
we provide a simple example:
Nations A and B feature both the following labor market outcomes in period 1: 10 percent
of taxpayers the actual tax and regulation burden remained unchanged.
5Other instruments can be taken in consideration while dealing with labor market legislation such as minimum
wages, unemployment benefits.
6Temporary employment contracts have been deployed rapidly across the rigid EU economies since the early
1990s. Featuring short (fixed) duration, lower costs, and more straightforward hiring procedures, they are designed
to be an agile instrument to increase labor market flexibility and, in turn, to reduce unemployment. In Italy, there
are two additional reasons which motivated the implementation of the reforms introducing temporary contracts.
First, temporary contracts might have helped increase labor force participation, which is particularly low among
women. Second, they might have contributed significantly to reduce the share of undeclared work, and therefore
labor tax evasion, which is estimated to account for 17% of the Italian GDP. In order to achieve the last objective,
the Italian Government approved a number of reforms, which introduced several types of short-term contracts to
target specific situations, in which undeclared work might have prevailed. As of today, in Italy the workers unions
count up to 46 different types of employment contracts. Moreover, the Italian share of short-term employment
jumped from 5% in 1990 to approximately 13% in 2010. The objective of this paper is, firstly, to test empirically
whether these reforms have been successful in reducing the share of undeclared work (through the “emersion”
channel).
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unemployment, 55 percent formal employment and 5 percent informal employment. At the
end of period 1 each nation implements a labor market reform. In period 2, the new labor
market outcomes are as follows: nation A features 15 percent unemployment, 55 percent
formal employment and 0 informal employment; nation B is characterized by 10 percent
unemployment, 58 percent formal employment and 2 percent informal employment. Nation
A was able to achieve full compliance in period 2: tax evasion has been eradicated, formal
employment is unchanged and unemployment has increased. In nation B, tax evasion is lower,
but still present, unemployment is stable and formal employment has increased. Therefore, we
observe in nation B a flow of workers moving from the informal to the formal sector, without
transiting into unemployment: this is what we refer to as the "emersion effect". We believe
that in period 2 the labor market outcome achieved by nation B is much more desirable,
equal and socially stable than the outcome achieved by nation A, even though the level of
compliance is lower.
From our ex post social program analysis, we find that the reform approved in Italy in 2003,
which introduced new types of temporary contracts and modified the legislation in relation to the
apprenticeship contract did not reduce informal work.7 In particular, not only the share of informal
workers did not decline as a consequence of the reform (extensive margin), but also the hours
worked in the informal sector were unaffected (intensive margin). Therefore, our evidence seems
to suggest that temporary contracts per se may not be an efficient instrument to reduce informal
work. In order to understand the causes for this negligible effect and to propose alternatives
policy interventions, we develop an ex ante evaluation using the ex post finding as a background
to design a theoretical model, which is essential to investigate the phenomenon of emersion and
to identify potential instruments to achieve it. Intuitively, since temporary jobs doesn’t seem
to be a relaible intrument for emersion (as evident from ex post social program evaluation) we
construct through a structural model an ex ante social program evaluation aimed to simulate
different policies intervention and we (ex ante) evaluate the best possible alternative paths to
emersion. This approach that pose a bridge between structural (ex ante) and reduced form (ex
post) policy evaluation seems a very suitable way to provide policy suggestions, in this we follow
the line of resonament enlighten in Heckman 20108. The choice of a search theoretical framework
in the spirit of Diamond (1981) and Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) is a suitable choice for our ex
ante evaluation moreover it is justified by its adaptability and flexibility in modeling transitions
of workers across markets and inefficiencies due to labor market frictions (Boeri & Garibaldi,
2002; Bosch & Esteban-Pretel, 2012; Meghir et al. , 2012). In the model we account for workers’
heterogeneity, social security contributions, and we allow for differentiated contracts, as in Tealdi
(2011). In addition, for the first time in the literature, we introduce the informal sector side by
side with the formal sector, where different types of contracts are available. Therefore, we bring in
flexibility by allowing firms to hire workers formally, choosing whether to offer them a temporary
7Please refer to section 3.1 below for further details.
8In particular following this approach we are able to solve the policy evaluation problems P1("Evaluating the
Impacts of Implemented Interventions on Outcomes Including Their Impacts on the Well-Being of the Treated
and Society at Large". and P3 ("Forecasting the Impacts of Interventions, Constructing Counterfactual States
Associated with Interventions Never Historically Experienced, including Their Impacts on Well-Being") as described
by Heckman 2010
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or a permanent contract, or informally. This menu of options enriches the analysis and expands
the set of policy tools that can be tested as potentially valid instruments to achieve “emersion”.
An important feature of the model is that the decision of firms to hire in the formal or informal
sector when they open a vacancy is endogenous. We assume that firms post generic vacancies and
when they extend an offer to the worker, they choose the sector (formal vs informal) and the type
of contract (short-term or permanent). If a worker is hired in the formal sector, the firm pays
social security contributions to the tax authority. If the worker is hired in the informal sector, no
social security contribution is paid, but the firm may be caught by the tax enforcement authority
and be subject to the payment of a penalty fee. The type of contract and the sector (formal or
informal) are chosen by the firm according to several parameters, such as the worker’s productivity,
the quality of the match, the social security fee, the probability to be caught, if operating in the
informal sector. In the model, we also allow for endogenous transitions of workers from the formal
to the informal sector and vice versa. When we calibrate the model according to the Italian
regulations and institutions, we test the effects of several policy interventions, such as the increase
of the monitoring rate of the informal sector, the increase of the penalty fee, the reduction of the
social security fees. We conclude that “emersion” is possible just with a well designed combination
of policies. In particular we focus on two different policy combinations:
1. policy (a): lower payroll taxes for permanent positions and an higher penalty fee for firms
operating in the informal sector;
2. policy (b): lower firing costs for permanent positions and an higher penalty fee for firms
operating in the informal sector.
While the former generates “emersion” through an expansion of permanent positions, the latter
generates “emersion” through an expansion of temporary positions, which may worsen the well-
known problem of duality in the formal sector.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the topic. The ex post
evaluation, the econometric strategy, the details of the reform approved in Italy in 2003, the data
used and the estimation results are presented in Sections 3. Section 4 introduces the theoretical
model, explains the calibration procedure and describes the ex ante policy analysis. Section 5
concludes the paper and discusses future research.
2 Literature review
There are several strands of literature related to this paper. First, this paper is related to the
literature on shadow economy, tax evasion and undeclared work. Tax evasion has been widely
reported since antiquity, and one which has always been difficult to examine on both theoretical
and empirical grounds. On the one hand, theoretical economic models based on taxpayer rationality
are unable to comprehensively describe the behavior of agents involved in the tax evasion setting.
If one applies a standard game theory, or any rational choice approach to the problem of tax
compliance, the level of penalties and enforcement that we observe would appear to be insufficient
9Please refer to Saint-Paul (1997) for further details.
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to explain the degree of compliance with tax laws. In the last 15 years, economists have attempted
to address the behavioral and experimental aspects of tax evasion, by analyzing the variety of
psychological reasons affecting the motivations for paying taxes such as honesty, fear, sense of
group membership (Alm et al. , 1992; Chorvat & Knoll, 2002).
Considering the empirical grounds, the lack of reliable data on tax evasion raises concerns about
the validity of the empirical results. Conventional data on evasion are obtained from administrative
audit databases which are usually selected data. Moreover, we seldom have sufficient information
to deal with such a selection. This happens mainly because audit authorities try to maintain
secrecy on their audit strategies. Recently, some advances in this field have been made using
randomized experiments (Kleven et al. , 2011), and by relying on individual audit data, where
the information provided is detailed enough to allow for the adoption of a proper selection model
(Di Porto, 2011; Di Porto et al. , 2013).
Second, this study is linked to the extensive empirical literature on short-term employment
contracts and their impact on European labor markets. Studies such as Gagliarducci (2005);
Güell (2003); Tealdi (2010) investigate the way short-term contracts have changed the pattern
dynamics across states and contracts. Specifically, their objective is to identify the role of short-
term contracts as screening device or as an instrument for firms to reduce costs. Their results show
that both in Italy and in Spain short-term contracts are used for both purposes. In addition, Pfeifer
(2009) shows that in Germany short-term contracts are utilized by firms to adjust the workforce
according to business cycle fluctuations. A parallel strand of the literature studies the effects
of short-term contracts on labor market aggregates, such as employment and unemployment. In
this context, findings are controversial. By investigating whether short-term contracts have been
effective in reducing the high rate of long-term unemployment in Italy, Berton (2008) concludes
that the objective was not achieved. Giannelli et al. (2012) show that in Italy short-term contracts
did not help increase the length of the first employment spell. In addition, the authors show that
in Italy short-term contracts are associated with higher uncertainty. On the positive side, for
the case of Spain, Aguirregabiria & Alonso-Borrego (2009) find that short-term contracts had a
positive effect on employment and job turnover and Güell & Petrongolo (2007) show that the rate
at which workers leave unemployment is higher after the reforms. This paper complements the
existing literature, by testing for the first time whether the introduction of short-term contracts
has been effective in reducing the share of undeclared work in Italy.
This paper relates also to the search model of dynamic labor demand of Mortensen & Pissarides
(1994). We extend their framework, by allowing firms to hire workers in different sectors (formal
or informal). Moreover, as in Tealdi (2011), firms are allowed to offer different types of contracts
(permanent or short-term) to the workers and are bound to pay social security fees whenever they
hire a worker in the formal sector. Within this literature, this model specifically relates to studies
which use the search theory to address the issue of undeclared work (Albrecht et al. , 2009; Boeri &
Garibaldi, 2002; Bouev, 2005; Fugazza & Jacques, 2004; Kolm & Larsen, 2003). However, for the
first time in the literature, our paper addresses the problem of informality in an economy where
permanent and temporary contracts coexist. The paper which most closely resembles our work
is the one by Bosch & Esteban-Pretel (2012), in which direct transitions from the formal to the
informal sector (and vice versa) are allowed and endogenously modeled. While they use this set
up to analyze the undeclared work phenomenon in developing countries, it serves our purpose to
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test the effects of the reforms implemented in Italy to increase labor market flexibility.
Finally, this paper is related to the growing literature on program evaluations (Behrman et al.
, 2012; Todd & Wolpin, 2006) based on the combination of the structural approach to economic
policy analysis with the program evaluation approach, as suggested by Heckman (2010). This
third way to do policy analysis integrates the best features of both approaches and extends the
interpretability and range of policy questions which can be addressed in social sciences.
3 Ex post evaluation: Empirical Strategy and Estimation
Results
In this section we describe the empirical strategy adopted to estimate the impact of the apprentice-
ship reform approved in Italy in 2003 (law no. 30/2003, known as “Biagi Law”) on the probability
of being employed in the undeclared sector and on the hours worked by undeclared workers, our ex
post evaluation. For this purpose, we use the difference-in-differences (DiD) and the triple differ-
ence (DDD) models. Before presenting the details of the estimation procedure, in the next section
we outline the main characteristics of the apprenticeship contract and the changes introduced by
the reform.
3.1 The apprenticeship reform
The apprenticeship is a type of temporary employment contract which targets young workers
(below the age of 25). With this contract the employer is required to provide to the apprentice the
vocational training necessary to perform an activity (trade, art, or business). The training must be
performed during the working hours by local authorities or accredited training institutions. The
qualifications gained during these training activities are acknowledged by a formal certification.
The labor costs associated with the apprenticeship are lower compared to regular contracts to
compensate for the training costs incurred by the firms. Specifically, social security contributions
amount to one third compared to permanent and other forms of temporary contracts (fixed-term
and temporary help agency contracts) and to one half compared to collaboration contracts.10
The “Biagi Law” amended some regulations to the apprenticeship to make it more appealing
for employers. The first modification concerned the age restrictions: the limit for eligibility was
raised from 25 to 30 years old. In addition, since local authorities were often unable to provide
training because of lack of public funding and infrastructures, the new law introduced the option
for firms to provide training at the workplace. Since the provision of training at the workplace
makes it hard to monitor compliance, the new apprenticeship could represent a viable instrument
for firms to lower labor costs and to encourage “emersion”.
In order for the new apprenticeship to become effective, regional rules for implementation
were needed. These rules have been carried out in a staggered manner. Since 2003 to the end
of 2010, only 11 out of 20 regions adopted the guidelines regarding the training content of the
10Workers hired on a collaborator contract are not employees of the firm; they provide their services as independent
consultants.
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new apprenticeship.11 In case of no regional legislation, industry-specific collective agreements
could rule on behalf of the regions.12 In this paper, we take advantage of these time and regional
(industry) variations to identify the casual effect of the new regulations on apprenticeship on the
share of undeclared work within a DiD framework, as in Cappellari et al. (2012).
3.2 Empirical Models
We estimate the causal effect of the apprenticeship reform on (i) the probability of working in the
undeclared sector and (ii) hours worked, by using a DiD research design. By exploiting regional,
sector, and time variations, we assess the causal impact of the policy by comparing the probability
of being undeclared in adopting and non-adopting clusters.13 The model is specified as follow:
P (Undeclared = 1|X)i,r,s,t = c+ γ(DReform)r,s,t + βXi,r,s,t + δr + µs + ζt + i,r,s,t (1)
where i identifies the individual, r the region, s the sector and t the time. DReform is the
dummy variable which takes on the value of one for the years, regions and sectors affected by the
policy. All estimates include a vector of region dummies, δr, that controls for mean differences
in the probability of working in the black sector across regions, of sector dummies, µs, that takes
into account mean differences across sectors, and year dummies, ζt, that controls for shift in the
dependent variable common to all regions and sectors. The matrix Xi,r,t includes a series of
individual characteristics such as age and its square, a dummy for women, a dummy for fixed-term
contract, a dummy for part-time work schedule, years of potential work experience and its square,
two dummies for education, the interactions between three experience dummies and two education
dummies, 14 occupations dummies, a dummy for migrants and a dummy selecting workers living
in urban areas. Some models also allow for region-specific linear trend. We run this equation
by using ordinary least squares, so the estimated coefficients are readily interpretable as marginal
effects.
If both employer and employee agree on declaring only part of the hours worked and leaving
the rest in the shadow, we could also expect an effect of the reformed apprenticeship contract on
informal hours worked. To tackle this issue, we specify and estimate models of the form:
log hi,r,s,t = c+γ(DReform)r,s,t+φBi,r,s,t+ϕ
[
(DReform)r,s,t×Bi,r,s,t
]
+βXi,r,s,t+δr+µs+ζt+i,r,s,t (2)
11Among the regions which first implemented the new rules Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Friuli Venezia Giulia and
Marche acted in 2005; Puglia, Sardegna and the province of Bolzano in 2006; Lazio in 2007 and Piemonte, the
province of Trento and Umbria in 2008.
12According to law no. 80/2005 industry-specific collective agreements may define the rules for training when-
ever the regional legislation is lacking. Collective agreements were signed in several sectors: Banking, Chemicals,
Construction, Energy, Food Products, Metals, Retail Trade, Textile, Transportation, Wood products, Telecommu-
nication.
13The formulation used in this paper is the benchmark regression DiD, where the customary DiD is extended by
controlling for a set of individual covariates.
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where the dependent variable is log hours worked by individuals i in region r, sector s and
time t. (DReform)r,s,t is the dummy for adoption of the new apprenticeship contract, Bi,r,s,t is the
dummy that indicates whether the worker is undeclared. The matrix Xi,r,s,t comprises individual
characteristics as in model 1. δr, µs, ζt are respectively region, industry and time fixed effects.
Some models also allow for region-specific linear trend. The coefficient of interest in equation 2 is
ϕ. It gauges the time difference in informal hours worked in the aftermath of the policy. Standard
errors in both models are clustered at the region level, therefore they are robust to arbitrary forms
of error correlation within a region.14
As mentioned above, the apprenticeship contract is a fixed-term labor contract targeted to
workers up to 30-year-old. This aspect gives the opportunity to carry out an additional exercise,
namely implementing a triple difference research design (DDD). In so doing, the treatment group
is refined such as to include workers under-30 in the adopting regions (sectors) that are most likely
to be affected by the reform; whereas the control group is made up of individuals under-35 but
over-30 years old in the adopting regions (sectors). As an additional control we use the under-30
population from the non adopting regions (sectors). This approach enables us to clear out any
difference between young populations across treated and nontreated regions (sectors) not arising
from the adoption of the new regulations. We specify models for the probability of working in the
undeclared sector and hours worked as follows:
P (Undeclared = 1|X)i,r,s,t = c+ γ
[
(DReform)r,s,t × dYi,r,s,t,
]
+ ψ(DReform)r,s,t + λdYi,r,s,t (3)
+
[
pidYi,r,s,t ×
∑
t
ζt
]
+ δr + µs + ζt + i,r,s,t
log hi,r,s,t = c+ γ
[
(DReform)r,s,t × dYi,r,s,t,
]
+ φ
[
Bi,r,s,t × dYi,r,s,t,
]
(4)
+ ϕ
[
(DReform)r,s,t ×Bi,r,s,t × dYi,r,s,t,
]
+ pi
[
dYi,r,s,t ×
∑
t
ζt
]
+ γ(DReform)r,s,t + φBi,r,s,t + ϕ
[
(DReform)r,s,t ×Bi,r,s,t
]
+ βXi,r,s,t + δr + µs + ζt + i,r,s,t
where dY is the dummy variable for the under-30 population. All other variables are defined
as in equation 1 and 2. The parameters of interest are γ and ϕ in model 3 and 4 respectively.
They inform us about the causal effect of the reform on the probability of working in the informal
sector and the hours worked in the shadow by the under-30 population.
This DiD analysis assumes that the evolution of the outcomes of interest for the adopting and
nonadopting regions (sectors) would not be systematically different in the absence of intervention.
Although there is no formal procedure of testing the validity of this assumption, we provide some
encouraging evidence that supports it. First, we compare how the share of undeclared work over
14Since the identifying assumption of the estimated DiD models relies on the staggered policy implementation
across regions and sectors, serial correlation can also be found within sector-region clusters. Therefore, a viable
solution would be to cluster standard errors at the region-sector level. We found that this clustering correction
produces slightly smaller standard errors than the ones reported in this paper, without however affecting our main
conclusions.
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total employment and informal hours worked evolve in treated and control regions.15 We report
this check in Figure 1. The top panel of Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the share of informal
work, while the bottom panel presents the time series of the hours worked in adopting and non-
adopting regions. The Figure reveals a striking similarity in the movements of the two series no
matter what the outcomes is, reassuring on the validity of the DiD identifying assumption. Second,
we carry out a falsification test based on placebo regressions. We re-estimate models 1-4 using a
false implementation date one year earlier. Results are shown in tables A-2-A-3 in the appendix.
For both outcomes, hours worked and the likelihood of being undeclared, this check rules out the
presence of heterogenous trends between adopting and nonadopting regions (sectors). It therefore
appears that adoption of the new apprenticeship contract is an independent random event.
3.3 Data
The empirical exercise uses individual data drawn from the Bank of Italy - Survey on Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW). The survey is carried out every two years with the aim of collecting
detailed information on household composition, age, education, labour market variables, incomes,
savings and consumption. To the scope of the present paper we consider the waves from 1995 to
2010. Individuals working in the undeclared sector are identified by matching two information:
wage and payment of social security contributions. We define as undeclared workers those individ-
uals reporting a positive wage without receiving paid the social security contributions. The latter
information is obtained by means of a specific question in the SHIW questionnaire asking whether
the interviewee had ever received paid social security contributions throughout his working career.
The question reads: Considering the employment history of. . . (name), did he/she ever pay, or
his/her employer pay, the social security contributions even for a short period? A negative reply
to this question, along with a positive wage, is thus the evidence that the individual worked in the
undeclared sector.16 The pooled sample consists of employed people aged 16 to 64 and amounts
to 48700 individuals, evenly distributed across the 8 waves. Descriptive statistics are presented in
table A-1 in the appendix.
3.4 Estimation Results
Estimates of equation 1 are found in table 1. Each column represents a regression of the indicator
variable, which is unity if the individual works in the undeclared sector (to have not receive paid
or have paid the SSCs) and zero otherwise, on region, sector and year dummies and the reform
variable, which is equal one in adopting regions (sectors) and zero otherwise. Columns (ii)-(iii)
control for a set of individual characteristics and column (iii) adds region linear time trends. To
15This check ignores the sector variation in the implementation of the policy, but it differentiates only between
adopting and nonadopting regions. Both regions and sectors are considered in the following test.
16In addition, for those people answering affirmatively, SHIW reports the cumulative number of years of social
security contributions paid by the employer to the worker. To test the robustness of our undeclared labor proxy, we
exploited such information too. In particular, we also treated as undeclared workers people whose number of years
of social security contributions lay below the 10th, the 5th and the 3rd percentile of the distribution of the following
ratio # of years of social contributions/# of years of potential work experience. Results not reported in the
present paper but available upon request are not affected by the choice of the undeclared labor proxy.
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purge the likely heterogeneity coming from the differential impact of the reform on population
groups or different labor market attachment across gender, the last two column, labelled Y oung
andMen, focus only on the under-30 and male populations. By lurking behind table 1 it seems that
no statistically different from zero effect of the apprenticeship reform in reducing the probability
of being employed in the informal sector is detected.
Estimated coefficients of the model for hours worked are reported in table 2. Each column
denotes different specifications of the linear regression of log hours worked by declared and unde-
clared workers and is arranged as in table 1. The first row of table 2 shows the estimates of the
impact of the apprenticeship reform on the undeclared hours worked. The coefficients are not sta-
tistically different from zero in all cases, suggesting that the reform did not affect the distribution
of hours worked across workers.
In line with our discussion above, table 3 reports the DDD estimates, where the under-30
population in nonadopting regions (sectors) is used as an additional control group. In table 3
we show only the coefficients of the triple interaction term, (DReform)r,s,t × dYi,r,s,t, in columns
(i)-(iii) and (DReform)r,s,t × Bi,r,s,t × dYi,r,s,t, in columns (iv)-(vi). Different specifications are also
presented and the number and type of controls are depicted at the bottom of the table. The DDD
approach does not provide any improvement in terms of statistical significance of the effect of
the apprenticeship reform. These results corroborate the fact that the apprenticeship reform did
not have an impact on neither the chances of being employed in the shadow economy nor hours
devoted to undeclared work. Taken all together, these findings provide encouraging support to the
idea that easing restrictions on the use of temporary contracts does not help tackling undeclared
work.
4 A search and matching model
The model is a continuous time search and matching model à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
with several innovative features. First, in order to account for the coexistence of formal and
informal markets we allow employers to hire the workers with a formal or an informal contract.
Second, to evaluate (ex ante) the effect of the introduction of temporary contracts on the informal
economy, we model the labour market before the reforms, when only permanent contracts are
available and we compare it with the market post-reforms, when temporary contracts represent
an additional option for firms. Third, we allow for endogenous transitions between formal and
informal and between permanent and temporary jobs. Finally, we model job separations as a
result of an endogenous process. In line with the standard search and matching model, we assume
that workers and firms meet in the labour market and the outcome of their match is a non negative
surplus. Matches occur randomly and according to a matching function m(u, v), which depends on
the total number of unemployed individuals u and the total number of vacancies v. The matching
function is increasing in both arguments, concave, and homogeneous of degree one. When the firm
opens a vacancy, it meets an unemployed worker according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
λ(θ) = m(u, v)/v, where θ = u/v is defined as the market tightness. The arrival rate of a job offer
for unemployed workers is γ(θ) = m(u, v)/u ≡ θλ(θ).
Workers are ex ante homogeneous. However, when the match worker-firm is formed the produc-
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tivity is revealed and heterogeneity emerges. The productivity of the match has two components:
an aggregate component p, which is common among all pairs worker-firm and an idiosyncratic
component , which is match-specific. The random component is drawn from the random distri-
bution G with support [G, G]. Depending on the productivity level of the match, the firm decides
which type of contract to offer to the worker.
4.1 The model pre-reforms
Firms can decide to offer a formal (permanent) contract or an informal contract to the unemployed
worker they meet, according to the productivity level of the match. If a formal contract is offered,
the firm is required to pay payroll taxes, whose marginal rate is τF , for the entire length of the
contract, and firing costs F , when the formal employee is dismissed. If an informal contract is
offered, the firm is not required to pay payroll taxes to fund the benefits of the worker. However,
imperfect monitoring is enforced by Government authorities: when the firm is caught, at rate φ,
the employment relationship is terminated and the firm incurs into a penalty fee σ. All the costs
are paid to the Government and used in activities external to the model. In this framework, we
allow informal workers to search on the job for better formal opportunities. Since it is assumed
that the search efficiency of an employed worker is lower compared to the search efficiency of an
unemployed worker, the rate at which an informal worker finds a formal job is χγ, where χ < 1.
After the match worker-firm is formed, at rate α a productivity shock may hit the work re-
lationship and a new  is drawn from a sector specific distribution Hj : [j, j] → [0, 1], where
j = {F, I} (formal, informal). The new productivity levels are i.i.d. across workers and time. The
future of the worker-firm relationship depends on the new productivity level of the match: firms
might decide to change sector (formal vs informal), to continue the ongoing match, or to dismiss
the worker.
In this model, low productivity matches tend to be framed within the informal sector, since
it is optimal for firms to bypass formal regulations. This happens even though these matches
are subject to higher turnover due to the Government monitoring and the searching for better
opportunities in the formal sector by informal workers.
In order to understand the labour market dynamics in detail, we will analyze in the next
paragraph the firm’s and worker’s problems.
4.1.1 The firm’s problem
Let V be the present discounted value of opening a vacancy for a firm. In addition, let J j, where
j = {F, I}, be the present discounted value for a firm of a filled position respectively in the formal
(F ) or informal (I) sector. Therefore, the value of posting a vacancy is:
rV = −c+ λ(θ)
∫ G
G
max[JF (′), J I(′), V ]dG(′)− λ(θ)V. (5)
The firm has to pay a cost c for the time the vacancy being open. At rate λ(θ) the firm meets an
unemployed worker, the idiosyncratic productivity level of the match () is revealed and the firm
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decides whether to offer a formal job, JF (), an informal job, J I(), or to keep the vacancy open
V .
If the firm decides to hire the worker in the formal sector, the value function for the firm for a
filled position with idiosyncratic productivity  is:
rJF () = p+ − (1 + τF )ωF () + αF
∫ F
F
max[JF (′), J I(′)− F, V − F ]dHF (′) (6)
− αFJF ()
The match generates a productivity flow equal to p + . In addition, the firm pays to the worker
a salary ωF () and to the Government payroll taxes, whose marginal rate is equal to τF . At rate
αF a productivity shock may hit the match and a new productivity level  is drawn from the
distribution HF . Together, workers and firms decide whether to keep the relation formal, to turn
it into an informal one, or whether to terminate it. In the latter two cases, the firm is required to
pay a firing cost F .
If the firm decides to hire the worker in the informal sector, the value function for the firm for
a filled position with idiosyncratic productivity  is:
rJ I() = p+ − ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[JF (′), J I(′), V ]dHI(′)− αIJ I() (7)
+ φ(V − J I())− φσ + η(V − J I())
The match generates the productivity flow p +  and the firm pays the worker a salary ωI().
However, the firm does not pay payroll taxes to the Government. At rate αI the match is hit
by a productivity shock and as a result the relation may stay unchanged, may be turned into a
formal one, or may be terminated, depending on the new productivity level. In addition, at rate
φ, Government authorities may discover the illegal activity of the firm, dissolve the worker-firm
match, and charge the firm with a penalty fee σ. Finally, we allow informal workers to look for
better (formal) jobs. The event that an informal worker transits from an informal to a formal job
happens at rate η.
4.1.2 The worker’s problem
Let the present discounted value of an unemployed worker be U . In addition, let the present
discounted value of an employed worker be W j, where j = {F, I}, respectively in the formal (F )
of informal (I) sector. Therefore, the value function for an unemployed worker is:
rU = b+ γ(θ)
∫ G
G
max[W F (′),W I(′), U ]dG(′)− γ(θ)U (8)
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The worker receives unemployment benefits b until he is unemployed. At rate γ(θ) the worker
meets a firm and the idyosincratic productivity level of the match is revealed. The worker may
receive a formal contract (W F ()), an informal contract (W I()), or no offer and continue to be
unemployed. If it receives an offer, it might be formal or informal and the corresponding value
functions for the worker are:
rW F () = ωF () + αF
∫ F
F
max[W F (′),W I(′), U ]dHF (′) (9)
− αFW F ()
rW I() = ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[W F (′),W I(′), U ]dHI(′)− αIW I() (10)
+ φ(U −W I()) + χγ
∫ G
G
max[W F (′),W I(′), U ]dG(′)− χγW I()
The formal worker receive a salary ωF () and at rate αF its employment relation may be unchanged
or may change by becoming informal or by being terminated, according to the newly drawn
productivity level. If the worker is offered an informal job, the worker receives a salary ωI() and
at rate αI , his productivity level may change. Therefore, its employment relation may become
informal, terminate, or it may be unchanged. Moreover, at rate φ the worker may lose its job if
the illegal working relationship has been discovered by the authorities. Finally, informal workers
may also look for better jobs while working and find a new position at rate χγ, where χ is the
search efficiency. Since the effort spent in looking for jobs while employed is lower than while
unemployed, the probability for employed workers to find a job is lower compared to unemployed
workers; therefore χ < 1.
4.1.3 Surplus and wage bargaining
A non-negative surplus is generated every time a pair worker-firm meets and it is match-specific.
The surplus changes according to the productivity level of the match and according to the type of
contract the worker is hired on. If the contract signed between firm and worker is formal, the firing
cost which the firm has to pay at termination enters in the surplus equation and affects the wage
bargaining. In addition, the marginal payroll tax rate is accounted for in the wage negotiations.
If the contract signed between firm and worker is informal, neither the firing cost nor the payroll
tax affect the wage bargaining. The Nash bargaining mechanism is used to compute the wage,
where βj, j = {F, I} represents the bargaining power of the worker respectively in the formal and
informal sector. We believe that the bargaining power of the worker in the informal sector is lower
than in the formal sector. For simplicity reasons, we assume that
βF
(1− βF )(1 + τ) =
βI
(1− βI) , (11)
which satisfies the above mentioned belief that βI < βF . Workers and firms always agree on the
decision to terminate the contract, thus there is no room in this model for involuntary unemploy-
ment.
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SF () = JF () +W F ()− (V − F )− U. (12)
βF [JF ()− (V − F )] = (1− βF )(1 + τ)[W F ()− U ]. (13)
SI() = J I() +W I()− V − U. (14)
βI [J I()− V ] = (1− βI)[W I()− U ]. (15)
As a result of the Nash bargaining, according to the sector, the following wage equations for
formal an informal workers respectively are derived:
ωF () = β
F
(1 + τ)(p+ + cθ + rF ) + (1− β
F )b. (16)
ωI() = βI(p+ − φσ + (1− χ)cθ) + (1− βI)b. (17)
4.1.4 Steady State
In order to compute the steady state of the model, we solve five equations in five unknowns. We
recognize four productivity thresholds and the market tightness as the parameters which identify
the equilibrium. The five equations summarize the job creation and job destruction conditions as
well as the free market condition V = 0.
When the firm hires an unemployed worker or an informal worker and the productivity level is
equal to R the firm is indifferent whether to offer a formal or an informal job.
JF (R) = J I(R). (18)
This equation defines the flows of workers from unemployment to formal and informal employ-
ment. When the firm transforms a formal job into an informal job the threshold productivity level
is equal to T . This threshold differs from the one described above, because when transforming a
formal job into an informal one the firm is subject to the payment of a firing cost.
JF (T ) + F = J I(T ). (19)
Therefore, this equation defines the flow of workers from formal to informal jobs. Finally, the
two job destruction conditions from a formal or an informal job are defined by:
JF (F ) + F = 0. (20)
J I(I) = 0. (21)
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From equation 19 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωF () as in 16
we obtain:
JF () + F = (1− β
F )(− F )
r + αF . (22)
From equation 18 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωI() as in 17
we obtain:
J I() + F = (1− β
I)(− I)
r + φ+ η + αI . (23)
The set of equations which define the equilibrium of the model is presented in the appendix.
We can prove that the equilibrium exist and is unique.
We can retrieve the steady state value of unemployment and formal and informal employment,
by looking at the workers flows. Normalizing the labor force to unity, we get:
nI = 1− nF − u (24)
u = α
FHF (F )nF + (αIHI(I) + φ)nI
γ(θ) (25)
nF = [α
I(1−HI(R)) + χγ(θ)(1−G(R))]nI + γ(1−G(R))u
αFHF (T )
(26)
We can also compute the flows of workers transiting across states. In particular, the transition
from unemployment to employment is given by the sum of the transition to a formal or an informal
job, which are described by the following equations:
JUI = γ(θ)G(R) (27)
JUF = γ(θ)(1−G(R)) (28)
The flows of workers transiting from a formal to an informal position and viceversa are given
by:
JFI = αF (HF (T )−HF (F )) (29)
JIF = αI(1−HI(R)) + χγ(θ)(1−G(R)) (30)
Finally, the flows into unemployment are given by the flow of workers fired while in a formal
job and those who are fired while in an informal job:
JFU = αFHF (F ) (31)
JIU = αIHI(I) + φ (32)
16
4.2 The model post-reforms
We now extend the previous model by including the possibility for firms to hire workers in the
formal sector for a fixed period of time (temporary contracts). Three are the main distinct fea-
tures characterizing this model. First, temporary contracts are modeled to be more flexible than
permanent contracts, since at expiration the firm may dismiss the worker without incurring in any
firing cost. Second, the marginal payroll tax rate associated with temporary contracts is lower
compared to the rate associated with permanent contracts. Finally, workers are allowed to search
for better jobs while employed, hence the firm may lose the worker at rate ξγ, where ξ < 1.17 In
the next section we will describe the firm’s and worker’s problems in detail.
4.2.1 The firm’s problem
Whenever a firm opens a vacancy it incurs in a cost c. At rate λ(θ) the firm meets a worker, the
productivity of the match is revealed, and the two parities agree on the future of the relationship.
If the productivity is very high, it is optimal for the firm to offer the worker a permanent contract.
If the productivity is very low, the firm keeps the vacancy opened. In the intermediate situation,
the firm may either offer a temporary contract or hire the worker in the informal market.
rV = −c+ λ(θ)
∫ 

max[JP (′), JT (′), J I(′), V ]dG(′)− λV (33)
Whenever the worker is employed, the firm receives a productivity flow equal to p+ . According
to the type of contract and the sector the worker is hired on, it receives salary ωP (), if permanent,
ωT (), if temporary or ωI(), if informal. If the worker is hired in the formal sector, the firm in
addition is required to pay to the Government payroll taxes proportional to the wage, corresponding
to a marginal rate τP , if the worker is permanent or τT , if the worker is temporary, where τT <
τP .18 At rate αj, where j = {P, T, I} (permanent, temporary, informal), the match is hit by a
productivity shock and the relationship may change according to the new productivity level. In
addition, if the worker is hired on a temporary job, the worker is allowed to look for better job
opportunities. Therefore, at rate δ it may find a better job and quit his current position, leaving
the firm with an open vacancy (Equation 35). If the worker is hired in the informal market, at rate
φ the firm may be caught by the Government authorities, be subject to the payment of a penalty
fee σ, and be forced to open a new vacancy. Finally, at rate η the worker may find a better job
17As in the benchmark model, we assume that searching while employed is less efficient than searching while
unemployed.
18The payroll taxes associated with temporary contracts are lower compared to the payroll taxes associated with
permanent contracts.
17
and quit his current position, leaving the firm with an open vacancy (Equation 36).
rJP () = p+ − (1 + τP )ωP () (34)
+ αP
∫ P
P
max[JP (′), JT (′)− F, J I(′)− F, V − F ]dHP (′)− αPJP ()
rJT () = p+ − (1 + τT )ωT () (35)
+ αT
∫ T
T
max[JP (′), JT (′), J I(′), V ]dHT (′)− αTJT ()
+ δ(V − JT ())
rJ I() = p+ − ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[JP (′), JT (′), J I(′), V ]dHI(′)− αIJ I() (36)
+ φ(V − J I())− φσ + η(V − J I())
4.2.2 The worker’s problem
When the worker is unemployed it receives unemployment benefits b and meets a firm at rate γ(θ).
According to the productivity level of the match, the worker may receive a permanent, temporary
or informal contract (Eq. 38). When employed, the worker receives a salary ωj() and at rate
αj,where j = {P, T, I}, the productivity level of the match may change and therefore also the
worker’s employment status. The worker might keep its current contract or may switch to any of
the other available contracts.
rU = b+ γ(θ)
∫ 

max[W P (′),W T (′),W I(′), U ]dG(′)− γ(θ)U (37)
rW P () = ωP () + αP
∫ P
P
max[W P (′),W T (′),W I(′), U ]dHP (′) (38)
− αPW P ()
If the worker is hired on a temporary basis (Eq. 39), in addition at rate ξγ, where ξ < 1, it
may find a better job. Finally, if the worker is hired in the informal sector at rate φ it may lose
his job because of the Government authorities intervention. Finally, at rate χγ,χ < 1, it may find
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a better job opportunity (Eq. 40).
rW T () = ωT () + αT
∫ T
T
max[W P (′),W T (′),W I(′), U ]dHT (′) (39)
− αTW T () + ξγ(θ)
∫ 

max[W P (′),W T (′),W I(′), U ]dG(′)
− ξγ(θ)W T ()
rW I() = ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[W P (′),W T (′),W I(′), U ]dHI(′)− αIW I() (40)
+ φ(U −W I()) + χγ(θ)
∫ 

max[W P (′),W T (′),W I(′), U ]dG(′)
− χγ(θ)W I()
4.2.3 Surplus and wage bargaining
The surplus, which is generated whenever a match is formed, is a function of the sector as well
as the type of contract the worker is hired on. The existence of firing costs F associated with
permanent contracts and the payroll taxes τ associated with any formal contract generates a
difference in the equilibrium wages, which is reflected in different surpluses. Therefore, three
levels of surpluses are computed: the surplus of a permanent contract, the surplus of a temporary
contract, and the surplus of an informal contract. As in the benchmark model, we assume that
wages are bargained via the standard Nash bargaining mechanism, where βj, j = {P, T, I}, is
the bargaining power of the permanent versus temporary versus informal worker. As a result,
firms and workers always agree on the sector as well as on the type of contract and involuntary
unemployment is not contemplated.
Due to the existence of payroll taxes for formal contracts, the sharing rules differ from the
standard one. Indeed, for certain productivity values, both workers and firms may agree upon an
informal contract to avoid paying taxes.
SP () = JP () +W P ()− (V − F )− U (41)
βP [JP ()− (V − F )] = (1− βP )(1 + τP )[W P ()− U ] (42)
ST () = JT () +W T ()− V − U (43)
βT [JT ()− V )] = (1− βT )(1 + τT )[W T ()− U ] (44)
SI() = J I() +W I()− V − U (45)
βI [J I()− V ] = (1− βI)[W I()− U ] (46)
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In order to guarantee tractability, we assume that the division of the surplus across contracts
is the same. This assumption satisfies our belief that βI < βT < βP .
βP
(1− βP )(1 + τP ) =
βT
(1− βT )(1 + τT ) =
βI
(1− βI) . (47)
As a result of the Nash bargaining, we can compute the equilibrium wages for the three types
of contracts:
ωP () = β
P
(1 + τP )(p+ + cθ + rF ) + (1− β
P )b (48)
ωT () = β
T
(1 + τT )(p+ + (1− ξ)cθ) + (1− β
T )b (49)
ωI() = βI(p+ − φσ + (1− χ)cθ) + (1− βI)b (50)
4.2.4 Steady State
The equilibrium steady state is defined by eight equations and eight endogenous parameters, which
identify seven productivity thresholds and the market tightness. The equations which define the
model describe the job destruction and job creation conditions for all sectors and contracts and
the free entry condition V = 0.
The first set of equations describe the transformation decision of a firm whenever a permanent
worker is hired. The threshold A defines the level of productivity by which the firm is indifferent
whether to keep the worker as a permanent employee or offer him a temporary job (and pay the
firing cost F ). Therefore it determines the flow from permanent to temporary employment. The
threshold S defines the level of productivity by which the firm is indifferent whether to keep the
worker as permanent or to transfer the worker to a job in the informal sector (and pay the firing
cost F ). Therefore it regulates the job transition from permanent to informal employment. Finally
the threshold Q defines the level of productivity below which the firm is dismissing the worker
and opens a new vacancy. Therefore, it defines the job destruction condition from permanent
employment to unemployment.
JP (A) + F = JT (A) (51)
JP (S) + F = J I(S) (52)
JP (Q) + F = 0 (53)
The second set of equations describe the transformation decision of the firm whenever a tem-
porary worker is employed. The threshold G identifies the level of productivity for which the
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firm is indifferent whether to offer a permanent or a temporary job. Therefore, it determines the
flow from temporary employment to permanent employment. The threshold L identifies the level
of productivity for which the firm is indifferent whether to offer a temporary job in the formal
sector or an informal job. Therefore, it regulates the flow from temporary employment to infor-
mal employment. Finally, the threshold B defines the level of productivity below which the firm
dismisses the worker and opens a new vacancy. Therefore it defines the job destruction condition
from temporary employment to unemployment.
JT (G) = JP (G) (54)
JT (L) = J I(L) (55)
JT (B) = 0 (56)
Finally, the last set of equations determines the flow from informal employment and unemploy-
ment. The threshold U defines the level of productivity by which the firm is hiring an informal
worker formally (on a permanent or temporary basis). It also determines the hiring decision in the
formal market (permanent versus temporary) for unemployed workers. The threshold L defines
the level of productivity by which the firm is indifferent whether to move an informal worker on
a formal temporary position. It also determines the productivity level by which the firm is indif-
ferent whether to hire an unemployed worker formally and temporary or informally. Finally, the
threshold V identifies the level of productivity by which the firm dismisses an informal worker.
Therefore, it determines the flow from informal employment to unemployment.
J I(U) = JP (U) (57)
J I(L) = JT (L) (58)
J I(V ) = 0 (59)
From equation 53 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωP () as in 48,
we obtain
JP () + F = (1− β
P )(− Q)
r + αP (60)
From equation 56 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωT () as in 49,
we obtain
JT () = (1− β
T )(− B)
r + δ + αT (61)
From equation 59 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωI() as in 50,
we obtain
J I() = (1− β
I)(− V )
r + φ+ η + αI (62)
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The set of equations which define the steady state equilibrium is presented in the appendix.
It can be proven that equilibrium exists and it is unique.19
We can now retrieve the steady state value of unemployment and formal and informal employ-
ment, by computing the workers’ flows across sectors and contracts. Normalizing the labor force
to unity, we get:
u = α
PHP (Q)nP + αTHT (B)nT + (αIHI(V ) + φ)nI
γ(θ) (63)
nP = [α
T (1−HT (G)) + ξγ(θ)(1−G(G))]nT
αPHP (A)
(64)
+ α
I [(1−HI(U)) + χγ(θ)(1−G(U))]nI + γ(θ)(1−G(U))u
αPHP (A)
nT = α
P (HP (A)−HP (S))nP + [αI(HI(U)−HI(L)) + χγ(θ)(G(U)−G(L))]nI
αT (1−HT (G)) + αT (HT (L)) + ξγ(θ)(1−G(G)) (65)
+ γ(θ)(G(U)−G(L))u
αT (1−HT (G)) + αT (HT (L)) + ξγ(θ)(1−G(G))
nI = 1− nP − nT − u (66)
We can also compute the flows of workers transiting across states. In particular, the transition
from unemployment to employment is given by the sum of the transition to a formal or an informal
job, which are described by the following equations:
JUI = γ(θ)G(L) (67)
JUT = γ(θ)(G(U)−G(L)) (68)
JUP = γ(θ)(1−G(U)) (69)
The flows of workers transiting from a permanent to a temporary position (and viceversa) are
given by:
JPT = αP (HP (A)−HP (S)) (70)
JTP = αT (1−HT (G)) + ξγ(θ)(1−G(G)) (71)
The flows of workers transiting from a formal to an informal position (and viceversa) are given
by:
JPI = αP (HP (S)−HP (Q)) (72)
JTI = αT (HT (L)−HT (B)) (73)
19By looking at Equation A.15, we can notice that a higher θ increases the left-hand side and lowers the right
-hand side of the equation. Therefore, a unique value of θ satisfies Equation A.15.
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and
JIP = αI(1−HI(U)) + χγ(θ)(1−G(U)) (74)
JIT = αI(HI(U)−HI(L)) + χγ(θ)(G(U)−G(L)) (75)
Finally, the flows into unemployment are given by the flow of workers fired while hired on a
permanent or temporary contract and those who are dismissed while employed in an informal job:
JPU = αPHP (Q) (76)
JTU = αTHT (B) (77)
JIU = αIHI(V ) + φ (78)
After we compute the steady state of the model, we are now ready to calibrate it to match
statistics (such as unemployment rate, share of formal and informal employment, informality rate)
in the data.
4.3 Model calibration
In order to perform the model calibration, we choose parameter values according to the literature on
the topic, the Italian legislation, and the statistics provided by the National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT). A description of the parameters can be found in table 4 (pre-reforms) and table 5 (post-
reforms). A summary of the parameter values is listed in table 8. The time period for simulation is
one quarter. Following Bentolila et al. (2012); Ljungqvist (2002); Mortensen & Pissarides (1994),
we set the interest rate r equal to 0.01. We assume that the distribution of productivity is uniform.
Following Bosch & Esteban-Pretel (2012), we fix the upper bounds of the distributions equal to 1.
We also set the lower bounds of the distributions to be equal to -1, except for the lower bound of
the G distribution, which is estimated together with the other endogenous parameters. Therefore,
we assume HF and HI to be uniformly distributed in the range [−1, 1] and G uniformly distributed
in the range [G, 1] for the benchmark model. For the post-reforms model, HP , HT and HI are
uniformly distributed in the range [−1, 1], while G is uniformly distributed in the range [G, 1].
The payroll taxes for permanent jobs, represented in the model by τP , are set equal to 0.35
as described in the document “Doing Business in Italy" (2008). The same tax is set to 0.25 for
temporary jobs. This value is computed averaging the payroll tax rates across different types of
temporary contracts in Italy. Moreover, we set the average cost of opening a vacancy c equal to
0.5, which corresponds to half of the productivity of a worker p, which is normalized to 1.
The monitoring rate φ is set equal to 0.05 and the penalty fee represented by σ to 0.45, as
in the data on labour inspections. We assign a value to the worker’s share of surplus (β) in the
pre-reforms set up in order to satisfy Equation 11. This implies that βF is set equal to 0.52 and
βI is set equal to 0.445. Following the same logic for the post-reforms set up, our goal is to
satisfy Equation 47. Therefore, βP , βT and βI are set respectively equal to 0.52, 0.5 and 0.445. All
these parameters fit in the range suggested by Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001). The most difficult
parameter to calibrate is the one representing firing costs. Firing costs are very hard to quantify,
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particularly for the case of Italy, where a complicated legislation sets different rules according to
company size, reason for firing the worker, and often allows the judicial court to decide upon.
However, in this last situation, as emphasized by Ichino (1996), given the uncertainty associated
with the length of the trial and the bias of the judges, it is hard to associate a number to the
firing costs supported by the company. Therefore, we follow the approach used by Bentolila et al.
(2012), who calibrate this value for France and Spain, and assign to F the value of 1.6. The
unemployment benefit b is fixed as in Bentolila et al. (2012) to 0.55. Before the reforms, we set
the probability to experience a productivity shock while employed formally represented by the
parameter αF to 0.01. The same parameter for informal workers is set equal to 0.05, which is
higher than in the formal market, as in Bosch & Esteban-Pretel (2012), to take into account the
heterogeneity among workers hired in the black economy. The efficiency of search, χ, performed by
informal workers is set equal to 0.3, to account for the fact that looking for a job while employed is
less effective. After the reforms, αP for permanent workers, αT for temporary workers and αB for
informal workers get respectively values 0.08, 0.2 and 0.2. The value associated with temporary
contracts reflects the higher volatility of productivity among fixed term employees. We assign to
the probability to fill a vacancy, λ, value 0.16 and 0.48 in the pre and post-reforms respectively; in
addition, since informal workers and temporary workers look for other jobs while employed, but
at a lower efficiency rate, we set the search efficiency parameters χ and ψ equal to 0.17 and 0.25,
respectively. These values are selected in order to match the average unemployment rate during
the four years before and after the reforms, the informality rate before and after the reforms and
the share of temporary contracts after the reforms. Table 9 presents the data (target values) and
the steady-state value of the unemployment rate, temporary contract share after the reforms, and
informality rate. As can be observed, we are able to match fairly well the chosen target variables,
in both periods.
4.4 Ex ante evaluation and Policy Implication: How to drive “emer-
sion”
We use the model to test the effects of several potential policy interventions on the equilibrium
distribution of formal versus informal and permanent versus temporary employment. First, we
study the changes in the distribution caused by the perturbation of single parameters. In table 10,
11, 12 and 13, we consider a reduction of the firing costs, F , an increase of the penalty fee paid
by the firm in case of inspection, σ, an increase in the inspection rate, φ and a reduction of the
payroll taxes associated with permanent contracts, τP , respectively. We focus on these parameters
for several reasons. First, because as we have emphasised in the introduction, increasing tax
enforcement or augmenting the fines for this non compliant behaviour are commonly considered
the two most compelling policy interventions to reduce evasion. The main difference between the
two interventions is the burden on the government budget: while the first policy may be quite
expensive, the second one would not affect the public expense. Second, we consider firing costs,
since in the literature they are treated as one of the main components of the European labor markets
rigidities, causing high unemployment and lower turnover. We believe that the perturbation of this
parameter could change the dynamics of the labor market and have potentially beneficial effects in
terms of emersion. Finally, we take into consideration the payroll taxes associated with permanent
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contracts, since they are considered quite high in the Mediterranean countries, and as such they
could create disincentives for firms to hire workers in the formal sector. In addition, the difference
in the payroll taxes between permanent and temporary contracts is one of the reasons which lead
to the creation of the duality problem in the Mediterranean labor markets (Saint-Paul, 1997).
We find that as the value of the firing costs decreases, total employment decreases due to both
lower permanent and temporary employment. At the same time both informal employment and
unemployment are higher. The explanation behind this result is in the fact that whenever firing
costs are lower, the job destruction of permanent positions is higher and the worker flows directed
towards the informal sector (the majority) or the unemployment pool increase. Temporary con-
tracts, which before represented a substitute for permanent contracts due to their higher flexibility,
are not anymore as appealing for the firm. Therefore, the ratio of temporary versus permanent
employment is lower. In summary, by reducing the firing costs per se, we are not only unable to
achieve emersion, but we are actually worsening the labor market conditions in terms of employ-
ment, formal and informal, and unemployment. We also find that for higher values of the penalty
fee and for higher values of the inspection rate, the informality rate decreases and the share of tem-
porary employment increases, leaving unemployment approximately constant. This result is quite
intuitive: by creating disincentives to hire in the informal sector, firms choose the best alternative
option, i.e., hiring workers in the formal sector with temporary contracts. However, it is interesting
to notice that the range of variation is much higher whenever the inspection rate increases, i.e.,
increasing the probability to inspect firms is more effective in reducing informal employment. This
leads us to conclude that, even though it is more costly from a public finance perspective, increas-
ing enforcement has a bigger deterrence effect on the likelihood of hiring in the informal sector
compared to increasing the fine. Finally, we find that reducing the payroll taxes associated with
permanent contracts has positive effects on the informality rate, while the unemployment rate is
also lower. In addition, we detect a strong substitution effect between temporary and permanent
employment, which drives the share of temporary employment to significantly lower levels. This
result is explained by the fact that by reducing the payroll taxes associated with permanent con-
tracts, the incentives for firms to hire permanent workers are higher, while the benefits for hiring
them on a temporary basis are not as strong as before. This reduces both the share of temporary
work and of informal work.
We then consider combinations of interventions to investigate whether pairing several policies
could generate stronger effects in terms of emersion. Specifically, we focus on four different policy
mix: we pair an increase of the inspection rate, φ, first, with an increase of the penalty fee, σ, and
later, with an increase in firing costs, F . We then repeat the same exercise by considering instead
of an increase of the rate at which informal workers are caught, φ an increase of the penalty fee,
σ.
The results of these policy experiments are shown in table 14, 15, 16 and 17, respectively.
Looking at the first two policy experiments, we find that reducing the payroll taxes associated
with permanent contracts has a stronger effect on the reduction of the informality rate, compared
to a reduction of the firing costs. In addition, while in the first scenario, both permanent and
temporary employment increase, leading to a slight increase in the share of temporary contracts,
in the second scenario, the increase of temporary employment is significantly higher compared to
permanent employment. In fact, in the first scenario, an increase in the inspection rate leads to
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a higher job destruction of informal employees, which comes along with a reduction of the flow
of temporary workers into the informal sector and a lower job creation in the informal sector;
therefore, the informality rate is lower. Moreover, since due to the lower payroll taxes, the job
destruction of permanent employees is lower and the flow of workers from temporary to permanent
positions is higher, we observe an increase in the share of permanent employment. In the second
scenario, while the effect on the informal sector is the same, the lower firing costs generate an
increase in the job destruction and a decrease in the job creation of permanent positions. This,
associated with a reduced flow of workers from temporary to permanent work, creates a reduction
in the share of permanent employment. Whenever we consider an increase in the penalty fee
instead of an increase in the inspection rate, we notice similar trends for the informality rate and
the share of temporary employment, but a smaller range of variation. Therefore, we confirm the
higher degree of effectiveness in reducing informality associated with the inspection rate rather
than with the penalty fee.
Finally, our last experiment involves a reduction of the penalty fee, φ, together with an increase
of the payroll taxes associated with temporary contracts, τT (table 18). We find that informal
employment is lower and permanent employment increases, while temporary employment declines.
In this scenario, in fact, we detect a substitution effect between temporary and permanent employ-
ment: both the job creation of permanent employment and the flow of workers from temporary to
permanent positions increase. Overall, the share of temporary employment is therefore lower.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate whether different types of policy interventions may be able to stim-
ulate the transition of workers from the informal to the formal sector. To reach this objective
we perform both an ex post and ex ante program evaluation analysis. We test whether the 2003
Italian labor market reform was effective in reducing the share of informal employment. From this
ex post evaluation, we conclude that there was no significant effect neither on the intensive nor on
the extensive margin. We use this evidence as a motivation and background for the development
of a search model where the informal sector coexist with a formal decor, in which both permanent
and temporary contracts are available. By calibrating the model according to the Italian labor
market characteristics, we study combinations of policy interventions which could generate “emer-
sion”. The findings of this ex ante evaluation suggest that combining lower taxation with stronger
enforcement could be effective in achieving our goal. In particular, we show that by lowering the
payroll taxes associated with permanent contracts and increasing the inspection fee, informality is
significantly lower and unemployment is stable. Similar results are obtained when lowering firing
costs and increasing the inspection fee, even though this may increase the share of temporary
contracts, worsening the duality which already characterizes several European labor markets. Per-
forming a cost-benefit analysis to identify which combination of policies is more implementable
and sustainable is in the top list of our future research agenda.
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A Appendix
A.1 Steady state equilibrium pre-reforms
The equilibrium of the model pre-reforms is defined by the following set of equations:
1 + τ(1− βF )
(1 + τ)(1− βF )
[
(1− βF )(R − F )
r + αF − F
]
= (R − I)
r + φ+ η + αI (A.1)[
(1 + τ(1− βF ))(T − F )
(1 + τ)(r + αF )
]
= (T − I)
r + φ+ η + αI (A.2)
F = −p+ β
F
(1− βF )rF + (1 + τ)b+
βF
(1− βF )cθ − (A.3)
αF
∫ T
HF
[
(1− βI)
(1− βF )
(′ − I)
(r + φ+ η + αI)
]
dHF (′)− αF
∫ HF
T
[
(′ − F )
(r + αF )
]
dHF (′)
I = −p+ b+ β
I
(1− βI)(1− χ)cθ + φσ − α
I
∫ R
HI
(′ − I)
(r + φ+ η + αI)dH
I(′) (A.4)
− α
I
(1− βI)
∫ HI
R
(1− βF )
[
(′ − F )
(r + αF ) − F
]
dHI(′)
c
λ
=
∫ R
G
(1− βI)(′ − I)
(r + φ+ η + αI)dG(
′) +
∫ G
R
[
(1− βF )(′ − F )
(r + αF ) − F
]
dG(′) (A.5)
By analyzing the equations above we can claim that the equilibrium exist and is unique.20
20Higher θ increases the left hand side of Equation A.1 and it lowers both formal and informal surplus, by
decreasing the right hand side of equation A.1 as both thresholds F and I depend positively on θ, while R does
not affect the expected profit from opening a vacancy. Therefore, there is a unique value of θ that satisfies the
equation.
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A.2 Steady state equilibrium post-reforms
1
(1− βT )
[
(1− βP )(G − Q)
r + αP − F
]
= (G − B)
r + δ + αT (A.6)
1
(1− βI)
[
(1− βP )(U − Q)
r + αP − F
]
= (U − V )
r + φ+ η + αI (A.7)
(1− βT )
(1− βI)
(D − B)
r + δ + αT =
(D − V )
r + φ+ η + αI (A.8)
(1− βP )
(1− βT )
(A − Q)
r + αP =
(A − B)
r + δ + αT (A.9)
(1− βP )
(1− βI)
(S − Q)
r + αP =
(S − V )
r + φ+ η + αI (A.10)
Q = −p+ β
P
(1− βP )rF + (1 + τ
P )b+ β
P
(1− βP )cθ (A.11)
− α
P
(1− βP )
∫ S
Q
[
(1− βI) (
′ − V )
(r + φ+ η + αI)
]
dHP (′)
− α
P
(1− βP )
∫ A
S
[
(1− βT ) (
′ − B)
(r + δ + αT )
]
dHT (′)− αP
∫ P
A
[
(′ − Q)
(r + αP )
]
dHP (′)
B = −p+ (1 + τT )b+ β
T
(1− βT )(1− ξ)cθ (A.12)
− α
T
(1− βT )
[∫ D
B
(1− βI) (
′ − V )
(r + φ+ η + αI)dH
P (′) +
∫ G
D
(′ − B)
(r + δ + αT )dH
P (′)
]
− α
T
(1− βT )
∫ P
G
[
(1− βP ) (
′ − Q)
(r + αP ) − F
]
dHP (′)
V = −p+ b+ β
I
(1− βI)(1− χ)cθ + φσ − α
I
∫ D
V
(′ − V )
(r + φ+ η + αI)dH
I(′) (A.13)
− α
I
(1− βI)
[∫ G
D
(1− βT ) (
′ − B)
(r + δ + αT )dH
I(′)−
∫ I
G
[
(1− βP ) (
′ − Q)
(r + αP ) − F
]
dHI(′)
]
c
λ(θ) =
∫ D
G
(1− βI)(′ − V )
(r + φ+ η + αI) dG(
′) +
∫ N
D
(1− βT )(′ − B)
(r + δ + αT ) dG(
′) (A.14)
+
∫ G
N
[
(1− βP )(′ − Q)
(r + αP ) − F
]
dG(′)
Again it can be proven that an equilibrium exist and is unique.
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Table A-1. Descriptive statistics of the sample.
Mean s.d. No. of observations
Undeclared worker 0.048 0.214 48700
Fixed-term job 0.117 0.322 48700
Age 39.692 10.403 48700
Tertiary education 0.135 0.342 48700
Secondary education .458 0.498 48700
Women 0.415 0.492 48700
Part-time work schedule 0.101 0.301 48700
Years of potential experience 19.507 11.270 48591
Living in urban area 0.131 0.338 48700
Non-native 0.066 0.249 48700
Blue-collars 0.463 0.498 42319
White-collars 0.424 0.494 42319
Executives and Managers 0.077 0.267 48700
Industry sectors:
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.0472 0.212 48700
Mining and quarrying; Manufac-
turing; Electricity and gas supply;
Water supply
0.280 0.449 48700
Construction 0.063 0.244 48700
Wholesale and retail trade 0.119 0.324 48700
Transporting and storage 0.041 0.200 48700
Financial and insurance activities 0.034 0.181 48700
Real estate activities; Information
and communication; Professional,
scientific and technical activities
0.062 0.242 48700
Activities of households as employ-
ers
0.047 0.212 48700
Public administration and defense;
Education; Human health and so-
cial work activities
0.300 0.458 48700
Extraterritorial organizations and
bodies
0.003 0.059 48700
Nuts 1 regions:
ITC: Northwestern Italy 0.281 0.450 48700
ITD: Northeastern Italy 0.200 0.426 48700
ITE: Central Italy 0.191 0.400 48700
ITF: Southern Italy 0.191 0.393 48700
ITG: Insular Italy 0.086 0.281 48700
NOTE. - To save space the summary statistics of only three occupations dummies and four NUTS 1 regions are shown. In the
estimates the full set of region dummies and occupation dummies is instead used.
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Table A-2. Placebo estimates of the impact of apprenticeship reform on the probability of being undeclared.
i ii iii Young Men
Reform 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Individual covariates no yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Region-specific linear trend no no yes no no
N 48700 48591 48591 9508 28296
NOTE. - Dependent variable is equal to one if individual declares to have not received paid or have not paid the SSCs. Reform is
lagged one period. Ordinary least squares estimates given. Robust standard errors (in brackets) allow for arbitrary correlation of
residuals within each region. Young: 16-29 year-old people.
Table A-3. Placebo estimates of the impact of apprenticeship reform on hours worked.
i ii iii Young Men
Reform 1.46 0.26 0.43 -1.03 -0.49
(0.68) (0.53) (0.60) (1.65) (0.30)
Individual covariates no yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Region-specific linear trend no no yes no no
N 48700 48591 48591 9508 28296
NOTE. - Dependent variable: hours worked by undeclared and declared workers; Undeclared: it is equal to one if individual declares
to have not received paid or have not paid the SSCs. Ordinary least squares estimates given. Robust standard errors (in brackets)
allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each region. Young: 16-30 year-old people.
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Table 1. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of apprenticeship reform on the probability of being
undeclared.
i ii iii Young Men
Reform -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Individual covariates no yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Region-specific linear trend no no yes no no
N 48700 48591 48591 9508 28296
NOTE. - Dependent variable is equal to one if individual declares to have not received paid or have not paid the SSCs. Ordinary
least squares estimates given. Robust standard errors (in brackets) allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each region.
Young: 16-30 year-old people.
Table 2. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of apprenticeship reform on hours worked.
i ii iii Young Men
Reform × undeclared -0.02 -0.15 0.07 0.64 -0.62
(0.75) (0.52) (0.61) (1.05) (0.59)
Undeclared -2.87 -0.73 -0.75 -0.94 -0.78
(0.63) (0.39) (0.40) (0.46) (0.48)
Reform -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.80 0.23
(0.23) (0.25) (0.27) (0.84) (0.22)
Individual covariates no yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Region-specific linear trend no no yes no no
N 48700 48591 48591 9508 28296
NOTE. - Dependent variable: hours worked by undeclared and declared workers; Undeclared: it is equal to one if individual declares
to have not received paid or have not paid the SSCs. Ordinary least squares estimates given. Robust standard errors (in brackets)
allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each region. Young: 16-30 year-old people.
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Table 3. Difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of apprenticeship reform on the probability
of being undeclared and hours worked.
Probability of being undeclared Hours worked
i ii iii iv v vi
Reform 0.00 0.01 0.01 -1.16 -0.81 -0.90
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (1.99) (2.16) (2.13)
Individual covariates no yes yes no yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region-specific linear trend no no yes no no yes
N 16891 16848 16848 16880 16837 16837
NOTE. - Dependent variable in columns i-iii is equal to one if individual declares to have not received paid or have not paid the
SSCs; dependent variable in columns iv-vi is hours worked by undeclared and declared workers. Estimates in columns i-iii are
the coefficients of the interaction, Reform×16-30 year-old; in columns iv-vi of the interaction, Reform×Undeclared×16-30 year-old.
Ordinary least squares estimates given. Robust standard errors (in brackets) allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each
region.
36
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
.0
6
.0
7
.0
8
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f u
nd
ec
la
re
d 
w
or
k
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Treatment group Control group
(a) Share of undeclared work over total employment
50
00
0
10
00
00
15
00
00
20
00
00
To
ta
l h
ou
rs
 w
or
ke
d
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Treatment group Control group
(b) Undeclared and declared hours worked.
Figure 1. Share of undeclared over total employment and hours worked in treatment and control groups.
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Table 4. Model parameters-Pre-reforms
Parameter Description
r Interest rate
βF Worker’s share of surplus in the formal sector
βI Worker’s share of surplus in the informal sector
G Upper bound of the G distribution
G Lower bound of the G distribution
F Upper bound of the F distribution
F Lower bound of the F distribution
I Upper bound of the I distribution
I Lower bound of the I distribution
φ Rate at which the informal job is discovered
σ Penalty fee for informal jobs
η Rate at which informal workers find a better job
αF Rate at which a productivity shock hits the match in the formal sector
αI Rate at which a productivity shock hits the match in the informal sector
b Unemployment benefits
p General productivity level
ξ Search efficiency of an informal worker
λ Rate at which a vacancy is filled
θ Market tightness
τP Payroll tax rate
pi Utility of a worker out of the labor force
nF Number of formal workers
nI Number of informal workers
u Number of unemployed
F Firing cost
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Table 5. Model parameters-Post-reforms
Parameter Description
r Interest rate
G Upper bound of the G distribution
G Lower bound of the G distribution
P Upper bound of the P distribution
P Lower bound of the P distribution
T Upper bound of the T distribution
T Lower bound of the T distribution
B Upper bound of the B distribution
B Lower bound of the B distribution
βP Permanent worker’s share of surplus in the formal sector
βT Temporary worker’s share of surplus in the formal sector
βI Worker’s share of surplus in the informal sector
φ Rate at which the informal job is discovered
σ Penalty fee for informal job
η Rate at which informal workers find a better job
αP Rate at which a productivity shock hits a permanent match
αT Rate at which a productivity shock hits a temporary match
αB Rate at which a productivity shock hits an informal match
b Unemployment benefits
p General productivity level
ξ Search efficiency of an informal worker
ψ Search efficiency of a temporary worker
λ Rate at which a vacancy is filled
θ Market tightness
τP Payroll tax rate for permanent workers
τT Payroll tax rate for temporary workers
pi Utility of a worker out of the labor force
nP Number of permanent workers
nT Number of temporary workers
nB Number of informal workers
u Number of unemployed
F Firing costs
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Table 6. Calibration exogenous parameter values
Parameter Pre-reforms Post-reforms
r 0.010 0.010
βF 0.520 −−
βI 0.445 0.445
βP −− 0.520
βT −− 0.500
αF 0.01 −−
αI 0.05 0.200
αP −− 0.080
αT −− 0.200
τP 0.35 0.35
τT −− 0.25
F 1.60 1.60
b 0.550 0.550
c 0.500 0.500
p 1.000 1.000
λ 0.160 0.480
η 0.200 0.200
δ −− 0.150
φ 0.050 0.050
σ 0.450 0.450
ξ −− 0.170
χ 0.300 0.250
G 1.00 1.00
F 1.00 −−
F −1.00 −−
I 1.00 −−
I −1.00 −−
P −− 1.00
P −− −1.00
T −− 1.00
T −− −1.00
B −− 1.00
B −− −1.00
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Table 7. Endogenous variables-Pre-reforms
Parameter Pre-reforms
T 0.537
R 0.609
F 0.472
I −0.367
G −1.00
Table 8. Endogenous variables-Post-reforms
Parameter Post-reforms
A 0.426
S 0.397
Q 0.230
G 0.831
L 0.290
B −0.330
U 0.607
V −0.420
G −1.000
Table 9. Data vs model
Pre-reforms Post-reforms
Data Model Data Model
Unemployment rate 8.9 8.3 7.1 7.2
Temporary/Permanent contracts −− −− 12.9 13.3
Informal rate 15.3 15.2 15.3 15.2
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Table 10. Employment share for lower firing costs, F .
F
1.6 1.55 1.50 1.45 1.40 1.35
Permanent 68.0 67.7 67.4 67.1 66.8 66.5
Temporary 10.5 10.0 9.6 9.0 8.7 8.2
Informal 14.1 14.8 15.5 16.1 16.8 17.5
Unemployment 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6
Informality rate 15.2 15.9 16.7 17.4 18.1 18.9
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 12.8 12.4 11.8 11.5 10.9
Table 11. Employment share for higher penalty fee, σ.
σ
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.70 0.80
Permanent 68.0 68.3 68.6 68.8 69.2 69.6
Temporary 10.5 10.9 11.4 11.8 12.7 13.5
Informal 14.1 13.4 12.7 12.1 10.9 9.8
Unemployment 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.0 6.9
Informality rate 15.2 14.4 13.6 13.0 11.7 10.5
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 13.7 14.2 14.6 15.5 16.2
Table 12. Employment share for higher values of the probability of an informal worker to be caught, φ .
φ
0.050 0.055 0.06 0.065 0.070 0.075
Permanent 68.0 68.5 68.9 69.2 69.5 69.7
Temporary 10.5 12.3 13.7 14.8 15.8 16.6
Informal 14.1 11.9 10.2 8.8 7.6 6.6
Unemployment 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.9
Informality rate 15.2 12.8 10.9 9.4 8.1 7.0
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 13.2 14.1 14.9 15.4 15.9
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Table 13. Employment share for lower payroll taxes associated with permanent contracts, τP .
τP
0.35 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.25
Permanent 68.0 70.8 73.4 75.7 77.8 79.7
Temporary 10.5 9.0 7.7 6.5 5.5 4.6
Informal 14.1 12.9 11.9 10.8 9.9 8.9
Unemployment 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.6
Informality rate 15.2 13.8 12.7 11.5 10.6 9.5
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 11.2 9.4 6.9 6.6 5.4
Table 14. Employment share for different values of the probability of an informal worker to be caught, φ and
lower payroll taxes associated with permanent contracts, τP .
φ 0.050 0.055 0.060 0.065 0.065 0.070 0.075
τP 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31
Permanent 68.0 71.2 71.6 71.8 74.3 74.5 74.7
Temporary 10.5 10.7 12.0 13.1 11.6 12.5 13.2
Informal 14.1 10.9 9.3 8.0 7.2 6.1 5.3
Unemployment 7.2 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.7
Informality rate 15.2 11.7 10.0 8.6 7.7 6.5 5.6
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 13.0 14.3 15.4 13.5 14.3 15.0
Table 15. Employment share for different values of the probability of an informal worker to be caught, φ and
different firing costs, F .
φ 0.05 0.055 0.060 0.065 0.070 0.070 0.075
F 1.6 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.5 1.5
Permanent 68.0 68.2 68.6 69.0 69.2 69.0 69.3
Temporary 10.5 11.9 13.3 14.5 15.5 15.2 16.1
Informal 14.1 12.5 10.7 9.2 8.0 8.4 7.4
Unemployment 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1
Informality rate 15.2 13.3 11.5 9.9 8.6 9.0 7.9
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 14.8 16.2 17.3 18.2 18.0 18.8
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Table 16. Employment share for different values of the penalty fee, σ and lower payroll costs associated with
permanent contracts, τP .
σ 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.65
τP 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31
Permanent 68.0 71.1 71.3 71.5 71.7 74.2
Temporary 10.1 9.4 9.8 10.3 10.7 9.3
Informal 14.1 12.3 11.7 11.1 10.5 9.6
Unemployment 7.2 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8
Informality rate 15.2 13.2 12.5 11.9 11.2 10.3
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 11.6 12.0 12.6 12.9 11.1
Table 17. Employment share for different values of the penalty fee, σ and lower firing costs, F .
σ 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.065 0.065
F 1.6 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.50
Permanent 68.0 68.0 68.3 68.5 68.8 68.5
Temporary 10.5 10.5 10.9 11.4 11.8 11.4
Informal 14.1 14.1 13.4 12.7 12.1 12.7
Unemployment 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.2
Informality rate 15.2 15.2 14.4 13.6 13.0 13.6
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 13.3 13.7 14.2 14.6 14.2
Table 18. Employment share for different values of the probability of an informal worker to be caught, φ and
higher payroll taxes associated with temporary contracts, τT .
φ 0.05 0.055 0.060 0.065 0.065 0.070 0.075
τT 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.30
Permanent 68.0 72.7 73.2 73.6 76.0 76.4 76.7
Temporary 10.5 6.9 8.5 9.8 6.9 8.0 9.0
Informal 14.1 13.2 11.1 9.5 10.0 8.5 7.3
Unemployment 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8
Informality rate 15.2 14.2 11.9 10.2 10.7 9.1 7.8
Temps/Perms ratio 13.3 8.6 10.4 11.7 8.3 9.4 10.5
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